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On alternative smart cities 
From a technology-intensive to a knowledge-intensive smart urbanism 
 
Colin McFarlane and Ola Söderström 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Smart urbanism seems to be everywhere you turn. But in practice the agenda is an uncertain 
one, usually only partially developed, and often more about corporate-led urban 
development than about urban social justice. Rather than leave smart urbanism to the 
corporate and political elites, there are opportunities now for critical urban scholarship to not 
only critique how it is currently constituted, but to give shape to a globally-oriented 
alternative smart urban agenda. An ambition like this means taking the ‘urban’ in ‘smart urban’ 
much more seriously. It means foregrounding the knowledges, political priorities, and needs 
of those either actively excluded or included in damaging ways in mainstream smart urban 
discourses. We outline steps towards an alternative smart urbanism. We seek to move beyond 
the specific to the general and do so by drawing on radically different initiatives across the 
global North and South. These initiatives provide tantalizing openings to a more socially just 
use of digital technology, where urban priorities and justice drive the use – or lack of use – of 
technology.  
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Introduction 
In the past few years, a number of critical pieces have been written about smart cities, moving 
the discourse beyond the self-congratulatory literature that was predominant until 2010. This 
work has deconstructed the discourse and ideology of smart urbanism (henceforth: SU) 
(Hollands, 2008; Kitchin, 2014; Söderström et al., 2014; Vanolo, 2014), analysed real smart 
cities through fieldwork in places as different as Dholera (Gujarat), Cape Town or Philadelphia 
(Datta, 2015; Odendaal, forthcoming; Wiig, 2015) and discussed alternative forms of smart 
urbanism with regards to corporate-led versions (Hemment and Towsend, 2014; Luque-Ayala 
and Marvin, 2015, early view). 
 
Considering the ideological nature of the discourse around SU and its close association with 
corporate interests (Hollands, 2015), one may wonder if this is not enough. Shouldn’t we as 
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scholars simply leave it there, having done the necessary work of critique? And, doesn’t 
continuing to talk about smart cities mean talking the language of the largest IT companies, 
and thereby unwittingly allowing them to set agendas in urban debate?1  
 
However, SU today is more than pure rhetoric: it has become a powerful and performative 
discourse, notably in the Global South. In Africa, it proliferates in new Masterplans and grand 
visions of urban futures (Watson, 2014a). In India, the SU narrative, supported now by the 
nationalist discourse of the Modi regime, is used as a means to justify land grabbing and 
dispossession (Datta, 2015). On the other hand, public intellectuals and activists, as our paper 
shows below, are trying to find ways of bending it so that it serves other interests than the 
ones represented by global business. In discourse and, increasingly, in practice, SU is a force 
driving urban change. We need to engage in the analysis of the variegated forms that ‘real’ 
smart urbanism takes on the ground, both in the urban policies of national governments and 
municipalities and in the grassroots initiatives and social movements that disturb, resist or 
create their versions of SU.  
 
The dominant SU discourse is “supply orientated, usually concerned with growth and 
economic priorities and more formal modes of social organization” (Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 
2015, early view, 8). It also promotes an apparently a-political or post-political view of urban 
development strategies (Söderström et al., 2014) paving the way for a corporatization of city 
governance (Kitchin, 2014). There is a tendency to present the ‘urban’ in ‘smart urban’ as a 
blank canvas upon which powerful sophisticated technology can simply be overlain and made 
to work in straightforwardly useful, new ways. There is little genuine commitment to social 
                                               
1 This is before we ask whether the critique is operating effectively: as Boltanski and Chiapello 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999) put it a few years ago: “the main factor explaining the solidity of 
capitalism since the 19th c is probably its capacity to listen to critique”. 
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and ecological justice here, and little critical thinking around how digital technologies might 
practically become embedded in the already exisiting worlds of urban life. 
 
If critique is to develop alternative ways of thinking about and doing SU, then it is vital that 
we seek to redefine it as a pre-requisite for a continued critical scholarly engagement, i.e. for 
work that continues to discuss SU beyond the dominant categories crafted by IT corporations 
or suggested by research funding programmes such as Horizon 20202. In order to open up the 
discussion to broader interests, to possibilities of dissent and democratic discussions on urban 
futures, we argue that we need to return to the original meaning of smart and move from a 
technology-intensive to a knowledge-intensive smart urbanism. In other words, a redefined 
smart urbanism should be grounded in places – actually existing cities – with their specific 
populations, resources and problems, rather than start with technology. We agree with 
Hollands (quoting Hoornweg) when he argues that “the ‘real’ smart city needs to start with 
the city and its attendant social problems, rather than looking immediately to smart 
technology for answers” (Hollands, 2015, 63), but we would push this claim further still to say 
that SU needs to be understood as contributing to already existing struggles in urban places, 
in other words: alternative SU needs to begin with ordinary urban places, knowledges, and 
needs. Our position should not be misread as technophobic: when we say SU should begin 
with knowledge and place, it does not mean that it should exclude technology. The argument 
is rather that technological solutions should, when needed, be shaped by place-relevant forms 
of knowledge. 
 
                                               
2 See in particular call H2020-SCC-2015: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/topics/2148-scc-
01-2015.html  
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To redefine SU as knowledge-intensive, we should, we suggest, ask three very simple 
questions and use them both to confront dominant visions of SU and to generate alternative 
SU. First, who frames what we need knowledge on? Second, who provides knowledge for 
urban development strategies? And third, what type of knowledge is needed? The presence 
or otherwise of technology, and the nature of that presence, then follows the identification 
of what the urban problem is and how the people are living those issues – ordinary and 
marginal urban residents in particular – would want to frame and address and actively 
respond to that problem. This means beginning not with technology, nor with smart, but with 
urban knowledge. 
 
To substantiate this argument, our paper unfolds in two steps. First, we examine the different 
dimensions of a knowledge-intensive SU, contrasting it with dominant corporate-driven logics. 
Drawing on theoretical work on urban learning and knowledge-production (Lindblom and 
Cohen, 1979; McFarlane, 2011) we discuss how this knowledge should be framed, by whom 
it should be produced and what aspects of the urban it should concern. Second, we relate and 
develop this general discussion by exploring alternative forms of knowledge production that 
revolves around smartness in cities of the Global South and the Global North. We conclude 
with a discussion regarding the new alliances between urban studies and urban policies within 
a redefined SU. 
 
Given the breadth of existing and potential alternative SU initiatives, it is important in an 
intervention like this to avoid focusing on one set of examples. The research challenge before 
us is to chart and support multiple different ways of stretching and developing genuinely 
progressive forms of SU. For this reason, we illustrate our claims through radically different 
urban contexts: informal settlements in different parts of the global South, and psychic 
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disorders in parts of the global North. If an alternative SU is to take shape, it must be able to 
speak beyond particular cases and instead develop through finding general principles that can 
guide it globally. As such, the presence of an unlikely set of empirical combinations in one 
paper actually becomes more not less valuable. While the content of alternative SU will vary 
considerably according to context – that, in fact, is part of our argument – the forms of 
alternative SU can hold stable across multiple places and issues. This does not imply that we 
propose an alternative model of SU. To do so would mean repeating one of the mistakes of 
corporate-led SU. Instead, we develop here basic features of an alternative position that can 
operate across different empirical cases. Indeed, it was through a series of conversations that 
we came to see that our own explorations of what an alternative SU might look like have – to 
our surprise, initially – much in common. Both cases are concerned with the ways in which 
marginalized groups learn the city, and with how, in turn, an alternative SU might be learnt 
through focusing on how these groups learn and differently articulate their needs. In making 
this argument, we both found that it was people, place, knowledge and politics that mattered 
most to successful SU, not technology. Technology is only useful insofar as it supplements 
people, place, knowledge and politics (by politics here we mean the priorities, often neglected 
or misunderstood, of marginal groups themselves). Therefore, our cases will explore how 
technology and knowledge can complement each other in alternative SU.  
  
We are not the first, of course, to suggest the formulation of an alternative SU. There are 
other recent calls, discussions and suggestions in that direction. Luque and Marvin (2015) for 
instance caution us not to over-emphasize differences between dominant and grassroot 
approaches but rather to examine and compare critically their rationalities. Leontidou (2015) 
suggests we lift out SU from its neoliberal context and connect it to translocal grassroot 
activism and creativity, which today often draws on the resources provided by ICTs. Hollands 
(2015) reflects on alternatives by discussing four initiatives in different cities where 
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technology is not the solution in itself, and where the focus is rather on people and 
cooperation. Our approach is to build on these discussions and extend these arguments by 
suggesting a redefinition of smart urbanism as a knowledge-intensive urban development 
strategy. 
 
 
Redefining smart urbanism 
Smart urbanism is a loosely connected set of confluences between data, digital technologies, 
and urban sites and processes. The promise continually sold is of the digitally-enabled data-
driven, continually sensed, responsive and integrated urban environment. Central control 
rooms, such as IBM’s Rio control room (Luque and Marvin, forthcoming), are imagined as 
constantly monitoring the distributed city, thereby bounding it as a manageable totality 
through real time data: spaces that integrate the governance of infrastructures in ways that 
are constantly up to date and actionable. Densities of people, traffic, goods, even weather – 
such as in flash flooding, in Rio’s case – are managed here (so the claims go) through a new 
urban informatics, increasingly premised on algorithms that articulate and represent large 
data sets, and which are inter-related through integrated governance based on new ways of 
seeing urban space.  
 
 
 
Recent critical scholarship identifies a series of risks in dominant formulations of what SU 
consists of: the obfuscation of the negative effects of IT on cities (Hollands, 2008), a return to 
the failed utopias of 20th c. high modernism (Greenfield, 2013), the rise of technocratic 
governance (Kitchin, 2014), the discrimination of ‘non smart’ citizens (Vanolo, 2014) or the 
prioritization of IT networks over other more urgent needs in municipal agendas (Söderström 
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et al., 2014). Analyses of actually existing SU (Shelton et al., 2015) describe the regimes of 
exception and processes of land dispossession accompanying the implementation of SU 
(Datta, 2015), the processes of depolitisation of urban redevelopment management (March 
and Ribera-Fumaz, 2014), or the priority given to the attraction of global business (Wiig, 2015).  
 
Other reports describe situations where different versions of SU oriented towards economic 
growth or social development are in tension, follow each other and overlap (Odendaal, 
forthcoming; Townsend, 2013). In Brazil, for example, alongside more corporate-driven SU 
initiatives, there are community-oriented efforts that direct digital mobile technologies to 
health monitoring in favelas3. These more ambivalent analyses of actually existing SU are both 
related to the various political orientations of municipalities (Ching and Ferreira Jr, 2015) and 
the proliferation of grassroots movements that either explicitly react to SU policies in their 
city4 or develop creative solutions that can be characterized as smart. 
 
More broadly, these reports indicate that SU is ever-more an unstable concept. To be sure, 
dominant versions, such as IBM’s (McNeill, forthcoming), are still the most visible in the public 
sphere, but SU increasingly signals vastly different initiatives and strategies. As critical British 
journalist Paul Mason (2015) writes of digital technologies more generally, the creative use of 
information – despite the best efforts of powerful corporate interests, their legal teams, and 
their monopoly tendencies – can include experiments with new uses that exceed control by 
capital, even if these too have their own hierarchies and complicities with hegemonic 
capitalist actors (Beer, 2015). Part of the opportunity for reconstituting the agenda of SU lies 
                                               
3 See, for instance, the social economy start-up PlataformaSaúde: 
http://www.plataformasaude.net.br/#!about-us/c4yk.  
4 See for instance the Hyderabad Urban Lab (http://hydlab.in/blog/notes/commentary/will-the-real-
hyderabad-please-stand-up/) on which more below. 
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in researching and developing how a wider range of actors are using digital technologies to 
pursue a more inclusive city.  
 
So where next? Steps towards an alternative knowledge-intensive SU 
Where then should we go from here? In their critical research agenda, Luque-Ayala and 
Marvin (2015, early view) point to three priorities, amongst others: developing multiple ways 
of theorizing, examining alternatives, and doing comparative research. Our contribution is to 
rethink the core of SU and examine how this reconceptualization might be relevant to grasp 
the power of alternatives. 
 
Efforts to reconceptualise SU are not new. For instance, Caragliu et al. (2011, 70) argue that 
the conceptualisation of SU has been too narrow and that “the stress on the Internet as ‘the’ 
smart city identifier no longer suffices”. They suggest a theorization that includes 6 axes: 
“smart economy; smart mobility; a smart environment; smart people; smart living; and, finally, 
smart governance” (Ibid.). Their aim is to put more emphasis on social inclusion, social capital 
and sustainability. We welcome this, but we also need to identify the core of SU. If it’s not IT, 
then what should it be? We aim also to go beyond the list-like frameworks for alternative SU. 
A checklist is precisely the sort of argument that corporations have the capacity to digest. It is 
a form of critique that they can easily absorb, because the corporate discourse on SU is 
designed to be expansive and encompassing.  
 
As Kitchin (2014: 3) notes ‘smart city vendors such as IBM and Cisco have [already] started to 
alter the discursive emphasis of some of their initiatives from being top-down managerially 
focused to stressing inclusivity and citizen empowerment”. Corporate visions of SU can 
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potentially turn any (new) theme into indicators and data, possibly also to captors or sensors 
to make it amenable to software analysis. This is exemplified by the cybernetic vision of SU 
promoted by IBM and its vision of cities as being composed of 9 systems or Cisco’s 4 layers of 
SU.5  
 
This cybernetic imaginary is functional to promoting and selling smart urban technologies, and 
adding new themes does not itself challenge it. If we want to overcome the trap of 
technocratic governance and the technology-push ethos, common in engineering sciences 
and of course in IT corporations, a more radical critique is needed. This critique should not 
evacuate the role of technology, which is central to the genealogy of SU (Goodspeed, 2015), 
but displace it. This is not to say either that all those involved in SU in corporations such as 
IBM steadfastly believe in the sole power of high-tech or even develop narrowly technology-
focused projects; but rather that these corporations’ storytelling can lure local governments 
into simplistic solutions. If we consider the three questions we raised in the introduction - who 
frames what we need knowledge on, who provides knowledge for urban development 
strategies, and what type of knowledge is needed? – these soutions are simplistic because 
they are removed from the knowledges, lives and priorities of ordinary residents. Moving 
beyond technology-push postures means opening up a knowledge-intensive space for 
thinking new, creative, smart initiatives and strategies where technology might be enabling 
but not the starting point and where solutions can often be low-tech.6 This requires, we argue, 
a redefinition of smartness as a knowledge-intensive rather than a technology-intensive vision 
of cities and their development.  
 
                                               
5 http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/ca/en/smarter_cities/overview/;  
6 See the arguments of the engineer Philippe Bihouix (2014) on the necessity of low-tech solutions 
(allowing repairability and collective use) in the perspective of a technically sustainable future. 
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Knowledge is etymologically at the root of the word ‘smart’. It may have become the standard 
move to reach for the Oxford English Dictionary, but it’s important to keep firmly in mind that 
the adjective smart is a very old word related to two semantic fields. The first is smart as 
something sharp, stinging, cutting. Smart describes here the properties of an object. The other 
set of meanings relates to qualities of speed, intelligence and neatness. Dominant SU 
discourses – given that they emerge first and foremost from companies who, after all, are 
selling commodities – generally push the second conception, and connect smart 
etymologically primarily to technology rather than to intelligence and knowledge.7  
 
But simply arguing for a knowledge-intensive conception of smart urbanism does of course 
not lead us very far either. Any city official involved in urban development would contend that 
her or his strategy is knowledge-intensive. In corporate-led smart urbanism, IT companies 
frame the knowledge that is needed. IBM with it’s 9 (or 10 pillars)8 for instance. Such framing 
presupposes that cities across the world can be envisioned in the same way. One of the 
consequences is that there is little or no conception of the urban at work in these discourses: 
of the histories, concerns, knowledges, and trajectories of what is already there. The urban is 
reduced in the flattest possible ways, presented as a surface – often in the form of glitzy 
images of the tech city yet-to-come – and implicitly rendered both secondary to technology 
itself and to powerful visual representations (see here, on the use of smart fantasies of African 
cities, Vanessa Watson’s [2014] work).  
 
                                               
7 We are aware of the limits of etymological argumentation – as exemplified by Heidegger’s (ab)use of 
etymology as ground truths, for instance in texts such as ‘Building,dwelling, thinking’ (Heidegger, 1971). 
What we pursue here is a kind of ‘strategic etymologism’ as a form of critique . 
8 Water and energy were in previous versions of IBM’s smarter cities vision considered together, but are 
now seen as separate urban systems. 
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The three questions we raised in the introduction may be straightforward, but we have found 
them useful and instructive in critically evaluating both mainstream and alternative SU. To 
take but one example in relation to the first question of who frames what we need knowledge 
on: in previous work one of us has looked at the variegated categories of public space in 
Europe, Africa and Asia and shown how framing public space with concepts from elsewhere 
may lead to misunderstandings and problematic policy decisions (Söderström, 2014; 
Söderström and Geertman, 2013). The way knowledge on cities is framed cannot be left to 
traveling corporate consultants but should rely on processes of grounded knowledge 
(co-)production. This itself can take multiple different forms. Consider for example the 
framing of knowledge through models of deliberative democracy and urban forms, such as 
those in that were once so strong around participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre (Baiocchio, 
2003; McFarlane, 2011), through to more revolutionary neighbourhood-based alliances such 
as those in Ecuador (Harvey, 2008).  
 
The second question - who provides knowledge for urban development ? – is of course closely 
related to the former. In the dominant SU narrative, there is a worrying return to high 
modernist forms of exclusively expert-driven urban planning (Söderström et al., 2014). 
Important therefore is to remobilise critical planning theories of the 1970s and beyond as they 
precisely were seeking alternatives to modernist-functionalist planning postures. The theory 
of usable knowledge (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979) is particularly relevant in this context. 
Lindblom and Cohen suggested that the production of usable knowledge requires the 
articulation of three forms: lay or ordinary knowledge, expert knowledge and knowledge 
generated by the interaction between experts and ordinary citizens. The question of whose 
and what kinds of knowledge and learning counts in the production of urban life has become 
an increasingly important area of debate in critical urbanism (e.g. McCann and Ward, 2011; 
McFarlane, 2011; Robinson, 2006; Roy and Ong, 2011; Watson, 2014b). A critical focus on 
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knowledge for alternative SU can shift attention from the formation of expertise and authority 
to the tacit and tactical imaginations engendered by urban inhabitation. 
 
Our emphasis, then, is less on data and more on knowledge. We are replete with data about 
cities, as charts, lists, maps, rhythms, intensities, numbers, and so on – an increasingly 
“encyclopaedic renditions of things” counted and curated, a “polytheistic pantheon of urban 
life, understood as a great ‘meanwhile’” (Thrift, 2014: 3). This prevalence exacerbates a 
confusion between data and knowledge, and between data-mining and knowledge 
production, that blurs the distinction between collecting data and interpreting what they 
mean. An implicit assumption of corporate-led SU regarding knowledge is that there is 
available data on what we need to know and that the essential questions are data-mining, the 
construction of inter-operable data sets and their connection and interpretation through 
algorithms. However, as the word indicates, stat(e)istics have historically always reflected 
what the State wants to know and hence been the product of a highly selective and power-
laden exercise (Desrosières, 2002). This is true for statistical data routinely compiled by 
different levels of state administration but also for the more local-specific choice of new data 
produced by myriads of sensors. 
 
In contrast, an alternative SU will entail a different kind of learning, a learning that 
foregrounds actually existing urbanism and the kinds of learning that ordinary residents use 
and need to improve their lives and places. Learning here is about two steps that follow the 
three questions posed above (McFarlane, 2011). First, identifying the knowledges and needs 
of those conventionally on the margins of the techno-fetishism of SU discourses – especially 
the urban poor and marginalized - as vital to any smart iniative that works for urban justice, 
and insisting that technology follows that identification, rather than being dropped into the 
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urban environment. And second, it entails understanding the knowledge-forms of ordinary 
urban residents, i.e. the ways in which those residents learn what matters in their urban 
environments and how that mattering might be supported. Both these moves position a 
politics of knowledge and learning as centrally important to the production of alternative SU. 
It is political because the question of whose knowledge and which forms of learning matter 
most is the critical starting point of any SU initiative.  
 
In forging an alternative to SU, then, we do not seek to abandon the term ‘smart’ altogether. 
Instead, in connection with an older sense of smart that relates to the generation of sharp 
insight, we ask from where does this knowledge come, and who frames it? We argue that a 
critical notion of smart must be rooted in the urban context, in the knowledge generated 
through the needs, desires and realities of ordinary lives, especially marginal groups so often 
at the margins of urban planning. Rather than leave smart to powerful corporate interests, or 
to a technofetishistic illusion of a real-time neatly ordered city, but the place-based, 
experiential and very often neglected urban realities of people living on the socioeconomic 
edges of urban societies. We set our case in relation to informal settlements and mentally 
vulnerable groups, and examine initatives that generate digitalized knowledges that put 
people and place before technology and which point to a critical project of populating an 
alternative SU.   
 
In contemporary urban situations a number of initiatives show that some areas, such as slums, 
are blank spots on our city maps and that the government lacks informations about critically 
important aspects of urban life. As we will show, there has been a surfeit in recent years of 
attempts to count, map, survey and document life in informal settlements through digital 
technologies, especially smart phones, websites, GPS, and multimedia broadcasting. Indeed, 
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it is here more than anywhere else where marginal urban spaces in the global South have 
encountered SU. We will suggest that here are the seeds of an alternative SU that reflects the 
knowledge needs of poor urban communities, although we do not suggest that this is a 
straightforward process (for example, the knowledge generated is not immune to uses that 
do not support the needs and advancement of the urban poor). Drawing on another research 
context concerning knowledge production with persons with mental health problems in 
Switzerland, we then show that alternative SU needs to be developed across the North-South 
divide and to mobilise not only a wide range of actors but also various approaches to data and 
knowledge production. Both sets of examples open out a new politics of learning for an 
alternative SU.  
 
Digitising slums 
There are two immediate key trends through which alternative SU can grow in relation to 
informal settlements. The first is to do with sensing urban infrastructures. For example, there 
is some potential in the use of sensors to measure water flows through pipes that trigger alerts 
if water use is outside of an expected normal range (McQuillan, 2014; 
http://www.libelium.com/smart_water_wsn_pipe_leakages). Such data can be made publicly 
available and as such could be used by residents and activists to hold states, utilities and 
private providers to account. Mapping water networks by distribution and volume may allow, 
for instance, activists to more effectively combat state claims that adequate water is being 
provided, or suggestions that it is the poor rather than say the state and/or inadequate 
maintenance that is to blame of low water supplies (Graham, Desai and McFarlane, 2014). 
There is a gulf between these types of developments and actual application within informal 
settlements, and while there may be potential here, we need to be mindful that such 
developments could do more harm than good. 
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For example, ethnographic research on water in informal settlements has shown that not only 
is the provision of water supplies closely linked to political and social differences based on 
gender, religion, class and caste, but that closer formal state control – for example through 
legalizing water in ‘illegal’ neighbourhoods – can have very uneven results, serving to improve 
conditions for some while entrenching exclusions for others (e.g. Truelove, 2015; Bjorkman, 
2015). It is vital then that any provision of smart sensing technologies in this context be 
handled with extreme care, and rooted in a strong understanding of the spaces, lives, politics 
and economies of informal settlements. Producing data and making it public is not an 
unqualified good, and the implications are not always predictable, and an alternative SU 
requires a careful, critical sensibility throughout the process. The most likely route through 
which smart technology might facilitate the constituting of more commonable resources like 
water in informal settlements is if interventions begin with the place and not with the 
technology. Moreover, the questions of who produces the data and how, and who interprets 
the data and how, are vital here, otherwise the potential for these kinds of initiatives to 
succeed is limited from the start – we know this from the long history of debates on 
knowledge and development (Satterthwaitte and Mitlin, 2014; McFarlane 2011; Watson, 
2014b). A commitment to learning is central –learning about the social and political dynamics 
of urban space, to see the world through the knowledge-concerns of those living on the 
margins of, in this case, infrastructural provisions, and to see technology from the priorities 
and hopes of residents themselves.  
 
The second engagement of SU in informal settlements follows on from this point in that it 
takes the place of the informal settlement to be central: the digitalization of slum data. Smart 
technology in the context of informal settlements is, at the moment, largely a question of up-
to-date data, and this connects to a wider set of initiatives around urban open-source 
urbanism (eg Corsín Jimenez, 2014; Nemer, 2013; Mehta and Yadav, 2016). This takes a variety 
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of forms, but the emphasis across different initiatives is the production of real time maps and 
the use of data to build partnerships for improved infrastructure, services, and housing 
(McQuillan, 2016). In addition, these initiatives often seek to forge alternative social 
representations of informal settlements in order to challenge stigmatized narratives and 
images. ‘Smart’ here is less about intelligent infrastructures and more about producing digital 
data to improve basic infrastructures in ways that reflect the needs and learning of 
marginalized urban communities. At the same time, these initiatives may constitute a 
foundation for future smart city developments. 
 
It is no accident that data generation is at the centre of emerging smart city efforts in informal 
settlements. One of the key challenges in the provision of infrastructure, housing and services 
to informal settlements – aside from the question of political will on the part of the state or 
the pressure on land from speculative investors (Davis, 2003; Goldman, 2011; Sassen, 2014) 
– is a lack of data (Joshi et al, 2013). Two examples will serve to illustrate the sort of initiative 
we have in mind: infrastructure audits by the Social Justice Coalition in Cape Town, and 
mapping and enumeration ‘Know Your City’ initiative of Slum Dwellers International with the 
Santa Fe Institute (and there are other relevant examples not discussed here, including 
Transparent Chennai [http://www.transparentchennai.com/about/] or the Hyderbad Urban 
Lab’s work on mapping and analyzing a variety of issues including transport, gender and toilets 
[http://hydlab.in/blog/notes/interns/public-toilets-in-hyderabad-an-audit/]). A key 
distinction of these inititiatves is that it is the residents, working with activists and sometimes 
technicians, who produce the data and interpret it, rather than the external if well-meaning 
consultant or professional.  
 
The Social Justice Coalition (SJC) is a movement that campaigns and researches on rights and 
provisions for the urban poor in Cape Town. A significant part of the movement’s work has 
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been focussed on sanitation conditions and budgeting in townships, especially in Khayelitsha 
where it is based, and in informal settlements (Odendaal, 2015). In order to produce data 
through which to combat the city council’s claims about sanitation provisions in Cape Town – 
claims which are typically very positive about the level of provision and maintenance – SJC 
decided to audit sanitation conditions in Khayelitsha, including the level of provision, the 
spatial distribution of toilets the level of maintenance, the conditions in which maintenance 
staff are forced to work, and the views of residents. The surveys, which involved residents and 
activists inspecting toilets, were then produced on digital maps and tables. Alongside this, SJC 
is developing a system of online reporting of sanitation conditions that supplement these 
online maps, whereby residents can use smart phones to upload information about 
dysfunctional toilets, inadequate maintenance, and related issues, to what becomes a 
powerful real time data set. One of the consequences of this data is that SJC has been able to 
question the city’s data and budgeting allocations in a more vigorous way, much to the chagrin 
of the city authorities. Locallly produced data is politicized by residents and activists, some 
from the area, some from outside, but in an approach committed to the priorities and 
concerns of the residents and the place. Knowledge becomes part of a political process with 
the urban state – here, again, an image of what an alternative SU might entail. 
 
The Slum Dwellers International ‘Know your City’ initiative, which is run with researchers at 
the Santa Fe Institute, is ambitious and exciting, and aims to provide interactive data on 6000 
informal settlements. This is a whole set of census data collected by groups of the urban poor 
about their own neighbourhoods - demographic, spatial and economic, from infrastructure 
provisions across space to livelihoods – which can be used to inform upgrading programmes 
with up-to-date data and to develop partnerships with local states. Like the SJC data, the 
strength of this data as a negotiating tool is that it speaks the language of the state. It is more 
difficult for the state to ignore quantitative and mapped data, especially in the easily movable 
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form of digital maps, than it is to ignore more qualitative calls for social inclusion. For SDI 
activists, such data is vital to developing partnerships where the actual realities of the lives of 
the urban poor are placed at the centre of discussions, and in an accurate, real time format. 
While SDI may lack the more radical politics of SJC, there is a common commitment here to 
producing, politicizing, and interepreting knowledge through the priorities and concerns of 
local people and places, even where that learning involves the support of outsiders.  
 
It is important to point out here that while data developed through digital technologies across 
all three of these cases has a kind of agency both in its form (it can easily circulate) and in its 
impact (it can have a visual power that influences thinking and practice), the politics of the 
data is shaped less by the data itself and more through the conceptions of the urban political 
at work in the different movements. There is a particular conception of incremental politics at 
work in these two cases, even if the form of that politics differs across the initiatives: a rights-
based politics of citizens holding a state to account (SJC), and a long-term process of 
partnerships between states and an entrepreneurial urban poor (SDI). Across these different 
initiatives is a commitment to incremental, real time data that can be tinkered with and 
politicized. In this sense, the form of data digitalization here mirrors the broader practice of 
incrementalism that characterizes informal settlements more generally (McFarlane, 2011; 
Simone, 2008; Silver, 2014; Pieterse, 2008), here in the context not of adjusting water or 
electricity connections or of gradual alterations to housing but of data collecting, sifting, 
translating and fusing. But there are also resonances between these initiatives and more 
explicitly mainstream smart city strategies, a kind of infrastructural mirroring between 
mainstream and alternative. 
 
On the one hand, there is the prospect here that the incremental logic of slum urbanism 
carries forward into a more radical politics towards an urban commons through more inclusive 
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urban policy and practice, of what Edgar Pieterse (2008: 6) has called ‘radical incrementalism’: 
“Surreptitious, sometimes overt, and multiple small revolutions that at unanticipated and 
unexpected moments galvanize into deeper ruptures that accelerate tectonic shifts of the 
underlying logics of domination and what is considered possible”. And yet on the other hand, 
there remains a question about what is specifically at work here that marks these different 
interventions out as constituting alternative examples of SU. While the actors, practices and 
aims at work here are largely distinct from more corporate strategies of SU redevelopment, 
there are certain characteristics that are shared across mainstream and alternative strategies.  
 
In particular, at work across mainstream and alternative smart strategies are shared principles 
of transparency, information-sharing, visibility, real-time engagement, coordination, and 
responsiveness. Moreover, initiatives such as the two discussed are not necessarily immune 
to becoming later absorbed by states in ways that detach them from residents concerns and 
fold them into more technocratic or politically regressive agendas. Indeed, while SDI 
emphasizes co-production of knowledge and urban priorities between residents and states, 
some critiques of the movement have argued that in practice the political priorties of 
residents are sometimes compromised or displaced by the agendas of the state 
(Huchzermeyer, 2011; Watson, 2014b; McFarlane, 2011).   
 
However, this infrastructural mirroring is itself a potential route through which digital politics 
generated from the informal settlement might help shape the larger smart city agenda. And 
it’s here that we find the openings of an alternative SU. In the two cases, there is a political 
starting point: that of the different forms of the active, continually informed, responsible 
citizen. The notion of enhancing citizen action through data is important to both movements. 
But this is a different kind of knowledgable citizen from the ‘smart citizen’ implicity in 
mainstream SU (eg see Vanolo, 2014), because the knowledge that matters here is that 
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learned by residents and activists living and working in informal settlements, struggling to 
provide basic amenities like housing, water and sanitation, and seeking to push new 
extensions of services and to develop more equal relationships with municipalities that often 
hold them at arms length and marginalize their ways of learning the urban world. There is the 
opening here, then, of not just an alternative SU, but an alternative smart citizen, rooted in 
the learning concerns of informal settlements, where the use of technology is only ever to 
supplement already identified ways of knowing and commitments to urban social 
improvement.  
 
There are three key points for thinking through the potential of digital technology to the 
constitution of alternative SU in which the informal settlement is a central rather than 
peripheral consideration. First, all three examples illustrate the need to start with the 
neighbourhood and not with the technology. Technological approaches that are layered into 
informal settlements that don’t understand the everyday life of the place, the struggles and 
needs or the residents, and the long term trajectories of incremental development, are likely 
to miss the target or, worse, hit the target in ways that are wholly inappropriate to local needs. 
The consequence is that these practices are always more than data gathering: they entail 
knowledge creation of people, places and issues that emerges from the concern people have 
about urban challenges and opportunities.  
 
Second, while digital technologies have sometimes unexpected agency, they are more likely 
to be shaped by conceptions of urban politics than to shape urban politics themselves. This is 
a reminder of the specificity of digital technology – it can be useful, but ultimately the political 
preoccupations that residents and activists themselves hold are likely to trump whatever 
seductive technology is presented: it is people, politics, knowledge, and place that matters 
most. And third, following on, there are lessons from social movements such as the three 
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above in how to place smart technology as part of the process of urban social improvement. 
In particular, the commitment to slow, incremental learning through groups and networks, 
and to positioning technology as one amongst several different practices that work together 
in (re)constituting SU as a more socially-oriented knowledge-intensive set of initiatives. Again, 
given the politics shaping these processes, the lines between mere data gathering on the one 
hand, and the creation of knowledge on the other, become blurred. 
 
Focusing on knowledge about and interventions in informal settlements could suggest that 
alternative forms of SU are adapted to the resource and data poor cities of the Global South 
while ‘mainstream smart’ is adapted to cities in the Global North. This is not the case. The 
continuous production of relevant and usable knowledge is an issue everywhere, as we now 
explore in relation to psychosis and the city. Our next section looks at research aiming to 
provide such knowledge in a particularly resource and data rich context: Switzerland. It also 
shows that urban data and knowledge that do not mirror those traditionally produced and 
used by the state are crucial to an alternative SU. Again, our focus is with groups on the 
margins of mainstream SU, groups who are included in SU in ways that too often centralize 
technology over the knowledge concerns of those in question. If it seems unlikely to think 
about, in one paper, the knowledge of residents of different informal settlements and the 
knowledge of those suffering from pychic health questions, then this is precisely our point: to 
build a more socially just conception of SU, alternative SU needs to focus on radically different 
routes from those well travelled by the likes of IBM and Cisco. In other words, we need – as a 
heuristic move in order to imagine the characteristics of an alternative SU – to investigate the 
absence of data and how they can be co-produced comparing most different cases rather than 
cases that we might otherwise prioritise for comparison simply because of their 
commonalities  (Robinson, 2011). 
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Exploring urban stress  
Persons with mental health problems constitute a marginal group in cities because they 
encounter social exclusion more often than inclusion and frequently have to compose with 
precarious livelihood situations (Knowles, 2000; Parr, 2008). For persons with a diagnosis of 
psychotic disorder, in the spectrum of schizophrenia in particular, marginality is also related 
to the mere fact of living in cities. As recent  medical research has shown, urban upbringing 
and living is a source of stress and has an intrinsic impact on the onset of non-affective 
psychosis (e.g.: Kelly et al., 2010; Krabbendam and van Os, 2005; Vassos et al., 2012). Drawing 
on an ongoing research project in which one of us is involved (Söderström et al., forthcoming-
a), we argue that, here as well, a blank spot exists in urban knowledge and that this spot 
cannot simply be filled by data- and techno-centric procedures. 
 
To affirm that mental health in cities is an unchartered territory might seem curious, given the 
amount of work published on this issue in the social sciences and in psychiatry, especially since 
the 1990s.9 However, there is still very little knowledge enabling an understanding of urban 
stress and the mechanisms through which urban living plays a role in the onset of psychosis. 
Existing studies on the city/psychosis nexus in medical research are predominantly 
epidemiological. Such studies use available statistical (or produce) data to track correlations 
between descriptors of urban areas (density, social deprivation, etc.) and the 
presence/absence of persons with mental health problems therein (e.g. Allardyce et al., 2005; 
Kaymaz et al., 2006; Kirkbride et al., 2012). Causal relation are then explored on this basis. The 
assumption is that ‘exposure’ to pathogenic factors and immersion in unfavorable 
environments are determinants of psychic disorders. Various research teams have thus 
recently produced data by looking at patients’ conditions before and after going out in 
                                               
9 See references in the previous paragraph for some key work. 
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potentially stressful urban areas (Ellett et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2014). In this perspective, 
data-mining and analysing connections between datasets can, in line with the promises of 
mainstream versions of SU, lead to new hypotheses and understandings of the role of 
environmental factors in psychosis.  
 
However, such methodologies have two serious shortcomings that limit their capacity to grasp 
the mechanisms explaining how complex urban milieus have an impact on vulnerable persons. 
First, they analytically decompose the urban into discrete variables and do not allow us to 
investigate the urban as encountered by persons with (actual or potential) mental health 
problems: in other words, to see the urban as a milieu assembling a multiplicity of 
characteristics. Second, they assume the existence of linear causal links between features of 
the urban and the development of mental health problems. Hence, the above mentioned 
experiments with exposure. What remains out of the picture is the agency and biography of 
persons with mental health problems. Therefore, epidemiology is at pains to provide a 
processual understanding of how people and the urban interact in ways that may or may not 
be problematic for persons with mental health problems. However, a series of recent studies 
are exploring intersections between psychiatry and the social sciences beyond epidemiology 
(for a summary: Fitzgerald et al., 2015). 
 
In this context, and in line with psychiatric research advocating a ‘first person’ approach to 
psychosis (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008), our research develops an experience-based approach 
relying on mixed methods (from video-recorded go-alongs to a survey) (Söderström et al., 
forthcoming-a). This approach aims to capture what matters for this specific marginal group, 
to use our previous phrasing. Rather than assuming in line with mainstream SU that adequate 
data is stored somewhere waiting to be treated, we consider, on the one hand, that 
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knowledge about persons with mental health problems’ relation with the urban is distributed 
among different actors and, on the other hand, that it must be produced by in situ 
experiments. Therefore, the co-production of knowledge between persons with mental 
health problems, psychiatrists, case managers and geographers is crucial in the research. The 
interaction of these different perspectives is necessary to produce ‘usable knowledge’. To 
produce biographical and situated knowledge, narrative interviews and video-recorded go-
alongs are of particular importance (see figure 3). They are the means to chart these other 
blank spots on the map of cities than the slums of Nairobi and to create processes of learning 
among people involved in mental health care. Forms of technology in the broad sense of the 
term – for instance, for the recording and analysis of videos – are thus involved in the analysis. 
But, technologies in the more specific sense of SU, such as automated data capture and 
analysis through sensors and software, are not useful at this stage, because we first need a 
careful description of how persons living with a diagnosis of psychotic disorder experience the 
city in their everyday lives. 
 
With these methods we are grasping both situations of stress that may have played a role in 
the onset of patients’ illness and ways of dealing with it: how smart persons with mental 
health problems navigate the city, avoid stressful atmospheres and search for zones of 
sensorial and existential comfort (see also: Bister et al., forthcoming; Duff, 2015). With regards 
to the specific question of the environmental factors in psychotic disorders, the central point 
here is that the factors of stress described by mainstream medical research are respecified by 
the results of the study. Let us take the example of density, recurrent in medical literature as 
a pathogenic factor and which could be used in a technology-intensive version of SU where 
the knowledge of marginal groups is not mobilized as an indicator for the location of mental 
healthcare facilities. 
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Instead of being seen as having the same effect on alI persons with psychosis, density appears 
in our study to be problematic primarily for persons where psychotic disorder is related 
predominantly to biological rather than family and social circumstances. Density is also 
unbundled by this approach as demographic density, described by the interviewees as 
problematic, rather than density of constructions. Finally, instead of an external causal factor, 
density appears as an element that can be experienced both as a protective and a stressful 
factor in the daily urban lives of persons with mental health problems (Söderström et al., 
forthcoming-b). These observations put into question the implicit linear causalities of 
epidemiological methodologies and indicate that relations between the urban and psychosis 
differ in relation to persons’ biographies and practices. They also indicate that therapeutic and 
planning strategies need to be fine-grained and specific to groups of patients with differing 
backgrounds and ways of life.  
 
In terms of alternative smart urbanism, this ongoing research is more generally indicative of 
three issues. First it shows, contra the focus on data-mining, that data (and a fortiori 
knowledge) is on many important questions insufficient or inexistent. There is insufficient 
knowledge on the relation between mental health and the urban or, to name but another 
example, between children and public space. Such knowledge cannot be simply gained 
through data-mining, but must be produced if we want to support a smart urbanism in the 
service of variegated urban populations rather than a small group of highly skilled ‘smart 
citizens’ (Vanolo, 2014). Second, a knowledge-intensive SU needs to draw on a large number 
of different sources. Usable knowledge needs to be co-produced: governmental or municipal 
statistics are framed in ways that limit their relevance for urban management and 
development. Expertise on urban matters, contra the principle of centralized urban cockpits 
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or control rooms, is distributed among various actors, including slum dwellers and persons 
with mental health problems. And third, not only should knowledge be considered as 
distributed but also as related to different viewpoints or postures: both ‘third’ and ‘first’ 
person perspectives - to use the terms relevant to our research on psychosis. In other words, 
mirroring statal forms of data and data production can be a fruitful strategy when aiming to 
improve living conditions in slums, but alternative SU also necessitates other knowledge 
production strategies. Counting elements, geo-localising them are procedures that do not 
suffice when the knowledge that is needed is relational, tacit, embodied and bound up with 
painful memories as in the case of the urban dimensions of psychosis. This is not an exception 
of course: in many other cases as well, such as violence on women, crucial aspects of urban 
well-being need to be understood by other means than the reductionist models of techno-
push versions of SU. 
 
Conclusion 
Our aim in this paper is to contribute to the emergence of alternative SU by charting 
approaches in radically different contexts. Rather than leave smart to the corporate elites, the 
critical purchase of our intervention is to argue that an alternative SU can be generated 
through foregrounding smart in the lifeworlds of different marginalized groups in the city. An 
alternative SU must embark on a dialogue that brings together seemingly unlikely 
combinations in the city: not the neat algorithms of IBM and Cisco, or technofetishistic 
promise of a real-time, seamlessly integrated city totality, but place-based, experiential and 
largely neglected urban knowledges of residents in precarious contexts. The project of 
building an alternative SU must entail a search for the defining features of a vision of SU based 
on such knowledges and not for an illusory alternative model. Vital to this strategy the need 
to consider the three questions and two steps we outlined in the first part of the paper in 
relation to any given SU initiative. These questions include: Who frames what we need 
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knowledge on? Who provides knowledge for urban development strategies? What type of 
knowledge is needed? Two steps follow: first, identifying the knowledges and needs of those 
conventionally on the margins of the techno-fetishism of SU discourses – especially the urban 
poor and marginalized – as vital to any smart iniative that works for urban justice, and, second, 
understanding the ways in which those residents learn what matters in their urban 
environments and how that might be supported.  
 
We have used two cases regarding slum mapping and mental health as laboratories to flesh 
out three central principles of alternative forms of SU: starting with the neighbourhood, 
producing usable knowledge and shaping technologies politically. In mainstream SU, data-
collection, -mining and -treatment technologies are the founding stones of urban 
management. However, situations across cities vary widely, and the priorities for both analysis 
and interventions need to be grounded in the specificity of places. While in this paper we have 
examined mapping slums and providing basic infrastructures as vital for many cities in the 
Global South, we are not suggesting that these issues do no apply to the poor urban areas in 
the North, from refugee camps and homeless groups to urban squats and economic/political 
occupations of urban space. Conversely, while we have examined mental health in relation to 
cities of the Global North, they are of course issues that are global in scope.  
 
It may be, of course, that there is scope to learn across these different examples of alternative 
SU – indeed, it was the similarities and differences between the two cases discussed here that 
led to this paper. Building an alternative SU will require more and not less of these kinds of 
‘unlikely’ comparisons and juxtapositions, in order to push exploration of different ways of 
approaching and doing alternative SU research and intervention.  
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The aim of such an endeabour is the production of usable knowledge, one that is not reducible 
to either existing statistics or ad hoc expertise and research on specific issues. As our research 
on mental health shows, it needs to combine distributed sources of knowledge and viewpoints 
on urban living. This form of knowledge is produced by activists and social movements in and 
on slums for instance, but also by researchers in urban studies. It is crucial for the 
development of alternative SU that such knowledge is scaled up and doesn’t remain in the 
neighbourhood or in the circles of academic publication. Work by social movements such as 
SJC or SDI can of course reach a wider audience and make a difference through the use of 
smart technologies in the traditional sense of the word (smartphones, social networks, blogs 
etc.). Important here are the possible ‘politics of the encounter’ (Merrifield, 2013) between 
gatherings and actions in places (neighbourhoods, squares, streets, debates in municipalities) 
and how these emplaced issues and actions are connected to concerned others at a distance 
through IT. On the academic side, alternative SU needs the further development of public 
urban studies that co-produce knowledge with citizens and particularly with marginal groups 
as well as the reconstruction of alliances between urban studies and urban planning, two 
worlds that have drifted apart in many countries.  
 
Finally, alternative SU should of course not be technology adverse. However, instead of 
technology-push strategies of urban management, a knowledge-intensive SU  should strive to 
shape technology to put it in the service of social improvement. The failed introduction of 
smart meters in the Netherlands a few years ago was due to the fact that issues of privacy had 
been overlooked and therefore to an insufficient social shaping of technology. The need to 
balance the role of technology and knowledge is crucial to an alternative SU. As our example 
of smart sensing infrastructures shows, to socially shape technology is a process that needs 
to be subtly attuned to the specificity of places if we want to promote social justice.  
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These general principles of an alternative knowledge-intensive rather than technology-
intensice SU are not simple intellectual speculations: they are enacted by activists and 
scholars in many cities in the world. However, for the moment they correspond to whispering 
and barely audible voices in the world of SU. SU is first and foremost a rhetoric battle-ground 
or, as Jazeel (2015) puts it, a representational strategy. A strategy, as Datta shows, which is 
very successful amongst young educated Indian middle-class people for instance. Now, 
compared to the glitzy pictures and techno-imaginaries of mainstream SU, work on mental 
health or slum mapping may not appear quite so glamorous. But therein is part of the problem. 
SU as constituted by IBM and co is all glamour, technology and noise – when it comes to the 
‘U’ part of SU, we find that there is a purposefully very thin conception of the urban. 
Purposeful because it is useful for corporations selling SU packages to depict the city as a flat 
arena awaiting their latest technological expertise, rather than as a complex multiform of 
different political and knowledge agendas and radically distinct needs that present profound 
challenges for urban social justice. This paper is an attempt to produce alternative starting 
points and openings for SU, that refuse to leave it in the hands of profit-churning multinational 
corporations and their simplistic imaginaries. It is an attempt to make other voices more 
audible.  
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